Whether the EFCC has power to investigate the disbursement and administration of funds appropriated by a State House of Assembly

EFCC v. GOVT OF ZAMFARA STATE & ORS (2024) LPELR-62933(CA)
Issue
GOVERNMENT AGENCY – ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION –

Whether the Economic and Financial Crime Commission has power to investigate the disbursement and administration of funds appropriated by a State House of Assembly

“…Section 38(1) of the Act which reads thus: – “(1) The Commission shall seek and receive information from any person, authority, corporation or company without let or hindrance in respect of offenses it is empowered to enforce an under this Act.”

In fact, the section went further to criminalize willful obstruction and failure to comply with any lawful inquiry or requirements made in pursuance thereof.

Ideally, the commission should have proceeded against the erring officials not for the order of the lower Court which is the subject matter of this appeal.

What this means is that the invitation letter, Exhibit ZAM-1 did not make specific reference to any funds, talk less of knowing whether same was appropriated or not by the State Assembly.

Then, the key issue is whether the investigation and/or prosecutorial power of the Appellant is restricted or confined to a particular funds? It is instructive to note that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is no doubt the supreme law of the country and it overrides all other laws in the country.

Where any conflict exists between the Constitution and any other statute, the Court or tribunal has a duty to interpret or apply such statute in such a way as to bring the statute in line with the letters and intendments of the Constitution. See Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the case of Nigerian Army Vs Yakubu (2013) 8 NWLR (Prt 1355) 1 at 26.

Now having highlighted the sacrosanct nature and binding force of the 1999 Constitution over all other laws in the country, it is therefore my respectful view that the powers of the Appellant (EFCC) under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act are neither restricted nor confined to any particular funds, appropriated or not appropriated by any legislative body in the country.

The EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, having been passed by the National Assembly pursuant to Section 4(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), same impliedly acquired same constitutional backing. In A.G. Ondo State Vs A.G. Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Prt 772) 222 at 339, it was inter alia held that where an enactment is in relation to a matter within the enumerated classes of subjects expressly assigned to the National Assembly by Section 15(5) and Item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly may by that enactment provide for matters which although within the Legislative, or even executive, competence of the states are necessarily incidental or ancillary to effective legislation by the National Assembly in relation to that enumerated matters.

The Appellant’ complaint, as stated elsewhere in this judgment, is not on the legislative competence of the National Assembly to establish EFCC, but strictly on its powers to conduct investigation in the disbursing and administering of money appropriated by the House of Assembly.

Even though, the Appellant’ letter of invitation made no specific reference to such appropriated money, it is worthwhile to examine the relevant provisions of Sections 125, 128, and 129 of the Constitution which formed the nucleus of the lower Court’s decision that it is, only the Auditor General and the House of Assembly that has the power to investigate the finances of a State and to determine whether a crime is committed.

The relevant provisions of Section 125 of the Constitution generally deal with the Audit of public accounts and subsection (4) thereof provides: – “(4) The Auditor General for the state shall have the power to conduct periodic checks of all government statutory corporations, commission, authorities, agencies, including all persons and bodies established by a law of the House of Assembly of that state.”

Section 128 of the Constitution relates to powers to conduct investigation and reads thus: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the office gazette of the Government of the state to direct or cause to be directed an inquiry or investigation into: a. any matter within which with respect to which it has powers to make laws, and b.

The conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry, or government department charged or intended to be charged with the duty of all responsibility for: i. executing or administering laws enacted by the House of Assembly, and ii. disbursing or administering monies appropriated or to be appropriated by such House. 2. The powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the provisions of this section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the house to: a. make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defect in existing laws and b. expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriate to it.”

Finally, Section 129 of the Constitution pertains the powers of the House of Assembly to procure evidence for the purpose of investigation under Section 128 of the Constitution.

The powers of the House of Assembly to conduct investigation towards execution or administering laws enacted by the House of Assembly in relation to disbursement or administering monies thereby appropriated by the House and the same is subject to the provisions of the Constitution.

It is to be borne in mind that the Constitution is the barometer on which the constitutionality or otherwise of a statute is measured. But before a Court of law declare a whole statute as inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore a nullity if some provisions are not inconsistent with the Constitution; a Court of law cannot hold that the whole statute is unconstitutional. In other words, the duty of the Court is to carefully examine the provisions of the Act and remove the chaff from the grain before arriving at a proper decision in the light of the provisions of the Act. See A.G. Lagos State Vs. A.G. Federation & Ors (2003) LPELR-620 (SC).

A careful and meticulous examination of the language or wording of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, particularly Section 6(a) and (m), 7(1)(a) and (b) thereof in the light of Section 15(5) of the Constitution, leaves no one in doubt, that the Appellant’ investigatory powers has constitutional flavour and hence not in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the investigatory powers of the House of Assembly as contained in Section 128 of the Constitution starts with expression “subject to the provisions of the Constitution”, which means it is liable, subordinate, subservient and or inferior to Section 15(5) of the Constitution, which give the state the power to abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of powers.

In NDIC Vs Okem Enterprises Limited & Anor (2004 – LPELR-1999 (SC), the apex Court has held that what the expression “subject to” generally implies is that what the section is subject to shall govern control and prevail over what follows in that subject section of the enactment, so that it renders the provisions to which it is subject to conditional upon compliance with or adherence to what is prescribed in the provisions referred to.

Thus, the lower Court was in grave error to have held that it is the Auditor General and the House of Assembly that has the powers to investigate the finances of the state as the investigatory powers of the state Auditor General and State House of Assembly are merely for the purpose of exposing corruption and preventing waste and thus confined to making laws to correct any defect found in the existing laws.” Per MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, JCA (Pp 19 – 26 Paras D – B)

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