OLUWATOYIN v. STATE (2018) LPELR-44441(CA)
“Having dispensed with issues four and five, I will return/reverse to handle issue one. The issue falls within a narrow compass. It quarrels with the conviction of the appellant when it was not proved that the car, the object of the theft, belonged to the substantive complainment: Olumide Olalekan Oladapo-PW1.
To begin with, the evidence of Olumide Olalekan Oladapo, PW1, is encased between pages 50-56 of the record: the touch stone of the appeal. In his evidence-in-chief and under the crucible of cross-examination, he described and referred to the car in question as his. This crucial piece of evidence was not challenged. The law permits the Court to act on unchallenged evidence, see Ayeni v. State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1525) 51. In exhibit B, Application for release of motor vehicle, PW1 asserted “… I am the right (sic) owner of the car….” PW4, the author of exhibit B1, Bond to produce exhibit in police station/court, testified, at page 67 of the record, that “the plate number I wrote on Exhibit [B1] is from the receipt of the vehicle produced by the complainant” [PW1].
There is an inference available here. Registration of vehicle with Motor Licensing Office creates a prima facie rebuttable presumption that the person who registered it is the owner, see Julius Berger (Nig.) Ltd v. Ede (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 526. The irresistible inference is that since the PW1 was the custodian of the plate number, he was presumed to have been the owner who registered the car with the appropriate authority. In law, inference is: “A conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical sequence from them”, see Muhammad v. State (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1583) 386 at 420, per Augie, JSC. The law gives the Court the unbridled latitude to draw inferences, see Babatunde v. State (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1391) 298; Owhoruke v. C.O.P. (2015) 15 NWLR (1483) 557. In the absence of any contrary evidence, furnished by the appellant, the reasonable presumption is that PW1 was/is the owner of the car. Again, in exhibit B1, PW1 is described as the owner of the car. Thus, exhibits B and B1, documentary evidence which are permanent, indestructible and incorruptible, unlike the malleable words from the vocal cord of man, concretise the PW1’s assertion of his ownership of the car. Even the appellant’s evidence, at page 75 of the record, “I later knew that Olumide (PW1) was using the vehicle in question before it was given to me” solidifies PW1’s claim of ownership of it.
In the presence of these pieces of unrefubed critical evidence, I hold the humble view that the respondent proved that the property, which was the subject of the offence, belonged to the PW1: Olumide Olalekan Oladapo. The appellant, in a bid to fetch/earn him the favour of the Court, placed high premium on the decision in George v. FRN (supra). Undoubtedly, this Court is bound to, unquestionably, follow the decision of the Supreme Court on the footing of stare decisis, see Ado v. State (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1587) 65. I have given a clinical examination to the decision in George v. FRN (supra).
In that case, the respondent failed, woefully, to prove fraud factored into the charge as an element of the offence levelled against the appellant. Indeed, the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses therein exculpated the appellant of the allegation of fraud. In the instant of case, ownership of car by the victim was proved. It must be underscored, that the ancient doctrine of stare decisis, evolved by the Courts to ensure certainty in law, which would have compelled me to kowtow to the decision in George case, operates and thrives where facts of cases are close and on all fours. It is lame where facts of cases are distinguishable.
The facts of these two cases are incompatible thereby eroding the applicability of the doctrine. I therefore, dishonour the appellant’s enticing invitation to bow to the decision in George case on account of facts differentials.” Per OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA (Pp 25 – 28 Paras C – E)