Whether Revocation of Bail is at the discretion of the Court.

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OMOREDE DARLINTON V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2018) LPELR-43850 (SC)


“The Appellant also complains that his bail was revoked suo motu by the trial Court when he raised objection to the admissibility of his extra-judicial statements, Exhibits J 1 – 4 and that notwithstanding the fact that the prosecutor agreed to holding trial – within – trial to determine the voluntariness or otherwise of his making of the alleged confessional statements the trial Court revoked the bail of the Appellant in order to scuttle the trial-within-trial and thereby coerced the Appellant to withdraw his objection. The application for trial-within-trial appears to be ruse or ploy to delay proceedings. At page 73 of the record the minutes of the proceedings on 13th March, 2012 shows objection to the admissibility of the extra-judicial statements of the accused persons. It also shows that all counsel agreed on 3rd May, 2012 for the trial-within-trial to commence; that is 50 days thereafter. The trial Court, granting the adjournment, stated: “It appears there is likelihood the case may take longer time and we cannot guarantee accused bail till then. Case adjourned (to) 3.5.2012 meanwhile Accused persons’ bail is revoked.” The proceedings resumed on 3rd May, 2012. At the commencement of the resumed proceedings Appellant’s withdrew “our objection for the tendering of the 1st and 2nd Accuseds’ statements in evidence”. Consequently, the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant, as the 2nd Accused, were admitted in evidence as Exhibits J1 – J4. The proceedings continued to the conclusion of the testimonies of the Pw.1 and Pw.2. The revocation of the bail the accused person was enjoying without blemish is an exercise of judicial discretion, which discretion has to be exercised judicially and judiciously. The reason for the exercise of the discretion must be given: CEEKAY TRADERS LTD V. GENERAL MOTORS CO. LTD (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.222) 132 (SC). Once the Court grants bail to an accused person; it ought not in law revoke such bail, unless there is evidence of some changed circumstances placed before it: AMEH EBUTE & 5 ORS v. THE STATE CA/L/196/94 unreported of 21st July, 1994. The Court in exercise of its discretion must only act on empirical facts or materials placed before it and not on extraneous or irrelevant matters: UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS v. AIGORO (1985) 1 SC 265 at 271. I agree with the Appellant that the trial Court, in revoking his bail acted inappropriately, wrongly and arbitrarily. Appellant’s counsel extends the argument from there. He submits that the bail of the appellant was revoked as a ploy to coerce the Appellant to withdraw his objection to the admissibility of his extra-judicial statements, Exhibits J1 – J4; and that a reasonable observing the proceedings would come to the conclusion that the Court was not fair to the Appellant. For this alleged breach of the Appellant’s right to fair trial, the cases – KOTOYE V. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.98) 419; PAM v. MOHAMMED (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.1112) 1 at 85, were cited. Be it noted that the wrong and arbitrary order of the trial Court made on 13th March, 2012 revoking the bail of the Appellant was not appealed, even though it was appealable by virtue of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. The Appellant in the circumstance is taken to have accepted it. The suggestion that the arbitrary revocation of the bail of the Appellant was the reason for the Appellant’s counsel on 3rd May, 2012 (50 days after) withdrawing their objection to the admissibility of the Appellant’s extra-judicial statements, said to have been made involuntarily, and also their request for trial-within-trial. Neither the Lower Court nor this Court, and any Court for that matter, does mind reading. Courts of law act on empirical facts placed before them: AMEH EBUTE & ORS v. THE STATE (supra). The success of this issue depends, as it appears, on this hazy and unproven assertion. The fact sustaining the issue is not borne by the printed record. That fact must be empirical and not suppositious or divinatory. I think, and I so hold, that the suggestion, that Appellant’s counsel withdrew, the objection to the admissibility of the Appellant’s extra judicial statements as well as the request for the trial within-trial because of the revocation of the Appellant’s bail, is tenuous and unsubstantiated.”
Per EKO, JSC (Pp. 7-11, paras. C-A)

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