by Chioma Angela Okeke
Abstract
A defendant who may have committed a crime under the influence of an intoxicant or who acts independent of the exercise of his will may still be held guilty because his prior fault of creating that state of involuntariness will substitute for the defendant’s lack of mens rea at the time of the commission of the offence. Thus, the defendant’s prior fault of creating that state of involuntariness, although may allow some exceptions, generally blocks the ‘defences’ of intoxication and automatism. This article adopts a descriptive approach in examining the application of the prior fault doctrine to intoxication and automatism cases. It will focus on the Nigeria’s Criminal Code and the Penal Code, with references to the Sharia law and the English jurisdiction. It concludes that though the prior fault doctrine has its associated problems of offending basic principles of the criminal law like the principles of voluntariness and fair labeling, it is a well-established principle under the Nigerian criminal law.
Keywords
Automatism, Fair- labelling, Intoxication, Prior fault,
Introduction
The laws relating to intoxication and automatism in Nigerian are primarily enshrined under the Criminal Code (CCA 2004)[1] for the Southern part of the country, Penal Code (PCL 1963)[2] for the Northern part of the country, and the Sharia law. The CCA 2004 and PCL 1963 do not define the word intoxication. Section 29(5) of the CCA 2004 only states that, ‘intoxication’ shall be deemed to include a state produced by narcotics or drugs. This section 29 of the CCA 2004 which provides for intoxication, discusses intoxication on the basis of when intoxication can be raised as a defence, while section 51 of the PCA 1963 discusses intoxication on the basis of the act of the accused. Fortunately, the definition of intoxication within our laws has been developed through case law. In Egbe Nkanu v The State, Obaseki J noted that, ‘intoxication in the legal sense is best described by its effect on the human sense of reasoning, that is, ‘defect of reason arising from drunkenness’.[3] This description has been quoted and adopted by other learned jurist, and since referred to as the locus classicus.
Automatism on the other hand, is an action or conducts occurring without will, purpose, or reasoned intention, such as sleepwalking.[4] It is a behavior carried out in a state of unconsciousness or mental dissociation without full awareness.[5] It simply means acting while unconscious.[6] In Festus Amayo v State, Uwaifo J referring to the Blacks’ Law Dictionary,[7] defined the term automatism as a ‘behaviour performed in a state of mental unconsciousness or dissociation without full awareness…the term is applied to actions or conduct of an individual apparently occurring without will…’[8] A claim of automatism is a claim that the link between behavior and mind was absent. It is a ‘denial of authorship’[9] In the often quoted English case of Bratty V Attorney General for Northern Ireland, Lord kilmuir accepted the definition of automatism as connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action is not conscious of what he is doing and has a defence because the mind does not go with what his brain has done.[10]
Like intoxication, automatism is neither defined under the CCA 2004 nor the PCA 1963 it is expressed under section 24 of the CCA 2004 as an act or omission which occurs independently of the exercise of one’s will.
The Blacks’ Law Dictionary defines the word ‘prior’ as, ‘preceding in time or order’ and the word ‘fault’ as, ‘the intentional or negligent failure to maintain some standard of conduct when that failure results in harm to another person’.[11] The phrase, ‘prior fault’, therefore means a preceding intentional or negligent failure to maintain some standard of conduct when that failure results in harm to another person. A defendant who has deliberately put himself in a condition (for instance, in a state of intoxication or automatism) that has made him to commit an offence will have no defence.[12] Ashworth and Horder, in referring to Paul Robinson’s article, ‘Causing the Conditions of One’s Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine’ noted, ‘A person should not be allowed to rely on an exculpatory condition if he or she had deliberately or even negligently brought about that condition’.[13] This concept is generally called the ‘prior fault’ doctrine, a principle that is more or less a principle of mens rea substitution.
Why the Prior Fault Doctrine?
It is not uncommon, that the justifications advanced for the application of the prior fault doctrine will be accepted with strong bias and reservations, especially for the academic scholars. This is because the application of the prior fault doctrine conflicts with many established principles of criminal law. For instance, it conflicts with the principles of contemporaneity, correspondence, mens rea, volition, fair labelling etc. (Unfortunately, further discussions of these principles and how they conflict with the prior fault doctrine are not within the scope of this article). As earlier noted, the prior fault doctrine applies to cases in which a defendant, at a time (T1), voluntarily does something that renders him incapable of voluntary action at a later time (T2), and while in that state of involuntariness at T2 commits a crime. It does not matter whether the defendant intended to commit a crime at T2. All that matters is that he caused the state of involuntariness that made him later involuntarily commit a crime. [14] In effect, the defendant’s prior fault at T1 blocks his defence at T2. What, then, justifies the prior fault doctrine, and why the insistence on its application despite its obvious challenges.
It has been rightly argued that allowing a general defence in all cases of intoxication or automatism would result in too many acquittals of guilty defendants and would bring the law into disrepute by offering no protection to the potential victims in these cases.[15] It seems generally assumed that someone who voluntarily becomes intoxicated should know that there is an unjustified risk of his causing harm while in that condition.[16] Delvin J noted in R v Kemp that, persons falling within automatism cases though blameless, might still represent a danger to the community.[17] In Imaseun v State,[18] the court stressed that it is vital to recognize that there could be serious evil consequences if a defendant should act on self-induced intoxication and seek to avoid taking the legal consequences of their act upon a claim that they are insane. The court opined that there is always the need to protect the society in every criminal case. Also, scholars have argued that the main functions of the criminal is to exert a general deterrent effect so as to protect major social and individual interests, and that any legal system which allows intoxication to negate mens rea would create an escape route to impunity.[19]
Generally, the prior fault doctrine has been justified under widely acceptable principles. On the principle of responsibility, Fischer and Ravizza,[20] through their ‘tracing principle’ have argued that it suffices for responsibility that a defendant exercises guidance control over his action, which control just requires that the defendant’s action issue from his own moderately ‘reasons-responsive mechanism’. They explained that, ‘When one acts from a reasons-responsive mechanism at T1, one can be reasonably expected to know that so acting will (or may) lead to acting from an unresponsive mechanism at some later time T2, one can be held responsible for so acting at T2.[21] In effect, the lack of voluntariness at the time of committing the crime should typically exculpates, but not when it can itself be traced back to a choice for which the incapacitated agent is responsible.
Like the tracing back principle, Husak tries to justify the prior fault doctrine through his control requirement theory,[22] a theory which holds extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the time of committing the offence, and even if they are acting involuntarily.[23] Again, the prior fault doctrine has been justified under the ‘causing the conditions of one’s defense principle.[24]The principle presupposes that a defendant who involuntarily commits an offence at T1 may still be held liable if he caused the condition that made him to act involuntarily.Ashworth and Horder stated that, the aim of the doctrine is to prevent defendant taking advantage of a condition if it arose through defendant’s own fault.[25] Dimock has however, argued that such a defendant should only be held liable if satisfied that the defendant was the cause of the condition that resulted in committing the offence, and the defendant intended, knew or foresaw that his act at T1 will result in T2.[26] To her, causation alone cannot make voluntary what is otherwise involuntary. If conduct crimes (for instance stealing) require a voluntary act as their actus reus, then those acting involuntarily cannot satisfy the conduct elements of such crimes.[27]
Further, the prior fault doctrine has been justified through the law of complicity and corporate liability. For complicity, this arises where the defendant might be held liable for a conduct crime even though it was his accomplice who performed the conduct crime.[28] For instance, the defendant may be held liable for ‘taking’ property even though he did not take the property himself but his accomplice took the property during a home invasion. Again, a defendant may be found to be in ‘possession’ of a firearm just by travelling in a vehicle that he knew contained a gun; and also co-conspirators will be held liable for the actions of their partners in crime, even without their physical relationship to the conduct constituting such crimes. For corporate liability and generally to other forms of vicarious liability, where the corporation (or an employer) is held liable for the acts and omissions of persons it employed.[29]
Finally, the principle has been justified under the constructive liability principle. This principle argues that a defendant who decides to violate the criminal law should be held liable for all the consequences that ensued.[30] Ashworth termed it, ‘the unlawful act theory’, since what justifies a conviction is mere commission of any crime against another person. Even if the defendant did not foresee a much serious injury that resulted, he is still held liable for that proscribed harm. Keating and others agrees that the prior fault doctrine is a form of constructive liability[31]. In effect, it may not be conclusive that the defendant had mens rea but ‘rather that he evinced the level of culpability that the mens rea requirement is designed to track’, the law will still be unwilling to allow him escape liability[32]
The Application of the Prior Fault Doctrine to Intoxication and Automatism in Nigeria
The prior fault doctrine has been applied to intoxication and automatism cases, both of which function either as a denial defence or as a general involuntary defence. These two defences are seen as falling within the ‘creating the conditions of one’s own defence camp’.[33] Thus, the doctrine does not apply generally to cases of involuntary intoxication and automatism. This is because, in these respect, there is no prior fault on the part of the defendant but usually that of a third party. So the discussions here will focus on those cases in which a person’s voluntary conduct at time T1 causes that person to lack voluntariness at T2, and at T2 the person commits what would normally constitute a criminal offence. The prior fault doctrine applies to such cases so that defendants are unable to rely upon their involuntariness to escape liability if they have culpably caused it.
Intoxication
As a result of the justification for the prior fault doctrine discussed above, the criminal law in most jurisdictions is reluctant to allow intoxication simply to negate mens rea. According to Chukkol[34], in both English and Nigerian law the defence of intoxication cannot be relied upon by a defendant who deliberately fortifies self with intoxicant to gain the guts to commit a criminal act (known as Dutch courage). In Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher,[35] the prosecution appealed against the decision of the court below which acquitted Mr. Gallagher (The Respondent) over the murder of his wife. The facts, according to the prosecution, were that the respondent had nursed the idea of killing his wife. He made futile attempts to do so but he could not. It was even reckoned for him that he was an aggressive psychopath. The respondent guzzled down a big bottle of whisky just to gain the guts to carry out the act he had hatched. The following morning, he left a knife in his wife’s heart; and a hammer too, which, according to the prosecution, suggested that he may have hit his wife with the hammer many times when he realized that the knife thrusts did not finish her off.
In allowing the appeal, the House of Lords held that the respondent cannot rely on the defence of intoxication, since he formed the guilty intent but could not do the act, and resorted to taking alcohol just to gain some courage to gruesomely murder his wife in cold blood; thus he cannot lean on the premise of Dutch courage to get off the hook for a crime which he deliberately committed.[36] Even where the defendant, though voluntarily intoxicated did not intend to commit an offence, the law will still hold him liable. In R v Pearson, [37] Baron Parke posited that, ‘voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime’. In R v Sheehan (Michael),[38] the court held that a voluntarily intoxicated defendant will be held responsible for any subsequent offences committed in an intoxicated state because, ‘a drunken intent is nevertheless intent’. In O’Grady’ case, where the defence claimed he acted under the drunken mistaken belief that he was in need of defence, the Court of Appeal held that defendant could not rely on his mistake if it stemmed from intoxication. [39]
In all cases of voluntary intoxication, the English courts have laid emphasis on the defendant’s own volition in taking a substance which causes him to cast off the restraints of reason and conscience. Where such is the case, the courts have insisted that no wrong is done to defendant by holding him answerable criminally for any injury he may have caused while in that condition. It is presumed that the cause of his condition in reducing himself by drugs and drink to that condition supplies the evidence of mens rea.[40] In Reniger v. Fogossa, which was the first English report on a drunken homicide, and which affirmed volition as its rationale, it was said that though the defendant ‘did it through ignorance … that ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it’.[41] In R v King,[42] the court stressed that a person who consumes anything he knows or ought to know that is intoxicant cannot plead involuntary intoxication.
In R v Allen,[43] the defendant argued that he became intoxicated because he had not realised that the wine given to him had high alcohol content. The Court of Appeal held that it is irrelevant that a defendant was ignorant of the precise nature or strength of the alcohol once he knew he was taking alcohol. However, in R v Hardie, where the defendant got intoxicated by taking valium for the purpose of calming his nerves, the court took into cognisance that valium is generally seen as a non-dangerous drug. Parker J noted that since it is merely sedative, it cannot be a conclusive presumption against the admission of proof of intoxication for the purpose of disproving mens rea in ordinary crimes, such as would be the case with voluntary alcoholic intoxication or automatism.[44] Although the court differentiated valium from other dangerous drugs, it may not be advisable for courts to determine whether or not a drug is dangerous or not on a case –by-case basis.[45]
Generally, under the CCA 2004, a self-induced intoxication is not a defence to criminal liability.[46] The law still considers that the defendant’s prior fault of getting voluntarily intoxicated at T1 ought to replace the missing elements of the offence committed at T2. [47] In Theophilus v State,[48] the court noted that, ‘prima facie, intoxication is not a defence if it is self –induced’. In Egbe Nkanu v State,[49] the Supreme Court, in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, held that self-induced intoxication cannot avail a defendant. The appellant in that case did not adduce evidence to support the defence of intoxication; rather, he succeeded in proving to the Court that he behaves abnormally at times. He voluntarily drank palm wine on the day he murdered the deceased; and according to him, he used machete to cut the deceased to death and he claimed he did so under the influence of alcohol. He did give evidence to the effect that he did not know what he was doing or that the act which he did, he did not know that such was unlawful. The general approach by the Nigerian courts is that self-induced intoxication is not a defence per se,[50] and that such a defendant is presumed to intend the consequences of his action.[51]
However, under the same section 29 of the CCA 2004, subsection (4), the Code creates an exception to the general rule that intoxication is not a defence. It provides that, ‘Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the
person charged had formed any intention, specific or otherwise, and in the absence of which the defendant would not be guilty of the offence’. Intoxication is relevant only insofar as it affects the mental states of the accused or the voluntariness of his conduct at the time of acting, and not because it shows that he acted for good or understandable reasons. In Nkanu v. State,[52] the court observed that cases where the defence under this subsection have been invoked in this country (Nigeria) are scanty. However, he observed that the provisions of this subsection enshrined the provisions of English Law on the subject of drunkenness.[53] On the question of drunkenness and intent, the learned jurist quoted authors of Archbold to say:
. . . Evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused person incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime charged must be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had such intent . . .
In R v Lipman,[54] the defendant killed a girl while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court held that his intoxication could be used to show that he lacked the mens rea for murder because to successfully prove murder, the prosecution must show the defendant had a specific intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The defendant’s conviction for manslaughter was upheld however; the Court of Appeal held that mental states induced by intoxicant could not be a defence to manslaughter as it is a crime which does not require specific intent. This position was also approved by the court in Imo v State. In that case, the court noted that in cases of self-induced intoxication unless the offence was one which requires proof of a specific intent or ulterior intent (specific intent crimes), intoxication was no defence to a criminal charge.[55]
It must be noted that section 29(4) of the CCA 2004 did not restrict relevance of intoxication to basic intent crimes but to ‘any intention, specific or otherwise’. However, like the English courts, the Nigerian courts have restricted its relevancy to only specific intent crimes. Therefore, the effect of the above decisions (like in Nkanu v State, Imo v State) is that in intoxication cases (not in cases of intoxication resulting to insanity), self-induced intoxication could provide no defence to crimes of ‘basic intent’ such as assaults, manslaughter etc. However, in crimes requiring ‘specific intent’, self-induced intoxication could sustain a plea of not guilty because of lack of the necessary mens rea establishing such crime.
Unlike the CCA 2004, under the Sharia law and the various Penal Codes regulating the Northern part, drinking alcohol is an offence,[56] except with lawful excuse.[57] Section 403 of the PCL 1963 provides that whoever being of the Moslem faith drinks anything containing alcohol other than for a medical purpose shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to ten naira or with both. Other examples of such lawful excuses may include mistake, compulsion etc. Drinking of alcohol under the Sharia law is punishable with flogging (jald).[58] Where a defendant takes alcohol within the acceptable/ lawful excuses, and which eventually intoxicates, thereby causing him to commit an offence, he will not be held criminally liable under any of the foregoing circumstances. Such a person is deemed to lack consciousness at the time of committing the offence. The case is treated as if the person acted under necessity or coercion or the defendant will be treated like an insane person.[59] The law will not hold him liable for his actions, because such a defendant is taken to be unaware of his actions at the material time.[60]
From the foregoing discussions, it can be seen that the prior fault doctrine applies absolutely under the PCL 1963 and the Sharia law in the sense that once a defendant voluntarily takes alcohol (outside permitted excuses) and commits an offence, he is not only guilty of drinking alcohol but also the offence committed. However, for the CCA 2004, the doctrine applies with some restrictions. For instance, the court must first of all, determine whether the offence committed is a basic intent crime or a specific intent crime. If it is specific intent crime, the fact of intoxication becomes relevant but if it is a basic intent crime, evidence of intoxication is irrelevant.
Automatism
Unlike in the above discussion on the application of the prior fault doctrine to intoxication cases, most of the discussions here will be based on the English law and cases. As Okonkwo noted, ‘genuine cases of automatism are extremely rare and only one discoverable known Nigerian case’ on automatism.[61] Automatism precludes criminal responsibility for acts performed involuntarily or unconsciously, as defeating the actus reus.[62] As LaForest J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Parks stated, automatism negates the element of voluntariness. The defence of automatism can be raised in respect to any offence (and is not restricted to murder, road accidents, rape etc.). However, since a successful plea result in a complete acquittal on the grounds that the act was not that of the defendant at all, coupled with the fear of allowing too many of such acquittals, the law has vigorously restricted the operation of the defence.[63] One of such restrictions is the application of the prior fault doctrine to automatism. Those who intend to rely on the defence should be blameless in causing the state of their automatism. Like voluntary intoxication, voluntary automatism suffers the same issues of mens rea substitution. Child and Reed have noted thus:
Rather, much like the intoxication rules, the automatism rules may function as the opposite of a defence, as a method of inculpation… This arises where D’s automatic state results from her own prior fault. In such cases, even though D does not satisfy the elements of the offence at the time it is committed (at T2), her earlier fault (at T1) substitutes for the missing elements at T2 to complete the offence as a form of constructive liability.[64]
Although, the prosecution bears the burden of proof in automatism cases and the responsibility of the defence is to produce credible evidence that he was exercising no control over his bodily movements, the prior fault doctrine will generally prevent the defendant from taking advantage of a condition which arose through the defendant’s fault. This point was stated in the case of Peter Buck,[65] lead guitarist of the band R.E.M (American Rock Band), who was charged of two counts of common assault and one count of criminal damage while being drunk on a plane. Mr Buck produced his prescription bottle, which did not contain a warning about mixing alcohol. Although Buck was acquitted because the court believed he had a good defence in the instance, the court noted that, a defendant cannot simply absolve himself of all responsibility for his actions by blaming pills and alcohol. A self-induced incapacity will not excuse; nor will one that could reasonably have been foreseen, such as the result of taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs or failing to have regular meals while taking insulin. In R v Quick, Lawton J held that there could be no acquittal on ground of automatism if the condition could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing or omitting to do something. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to excuse any driver or other person engaged in an activity where public safety is an issue, from the consequences of a loss of control that occurred after losing consciousness. The court went further to give examples of such instances, like taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, or failing to take regular meals whist taking insulin’.[66]
Another relevant issue on automatism is whether the doctrine of prior fault should apply at all in all automatism cases. In Kay v Butterworth,[67] the defendant’s car collided with soldiers marching down the road because he fell asleep while driving home from night –work. He was convicted for careless driving, not in respect of the collision but for falling asleep. The conviction was due to the defendant’s earlier failure to stop driving when he felt drowsy. The court held that in driving cases, preceding fault may negate automatism where the driver falls asleep or suffers some form of attack that could have been predicted. One advantage of the approach in Kay and Butterworth is that, unlike in R v Quick, at least the court recognised that the driving was involuntary and involuntary act cannot be subject of criminal liability. However, the approach will seem justified only if the ‘offence is of a continuing nature and where the charge can be appropriately worded’. [68]
The reasoning of the court in Kay v Butterworth seems to match with the United State case of People v. Decina,[69] where any foreseeable loss of control was held to exclude automatism. In this case, the defendant while driving his car had an epileptic seizure and the car went out of control, killing four people. The defendant was convicted of negligent homicide because he had voluntarily driven an automobile without assistance knowing that a seizure was possible (breaching Penal Law 1053 on the negligent operation of a motor vehicle). In convicting the defendant, the court believed that even though a reflex or a convulsion may be an excuse, the defendant cannot successful plead automatism because he knowingly undertook the risk of driving while suffering from a disease that is associated with frequent convulsions. So, the actus reus was established when he began driving.
In R v Marison[70], the defendant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving despite the fact that at the point of collision he was unconscious as a result of a hypoglycaemic episode. The defendant had suffered such episodes before and so his prior fault in still deciding to drive (at T1) substituted for his lack of voluntariness when completing the other offence elements (at T2). McCowan J held that, even though the defendant was in an automatic state, defence of automatism will not stand since he had already committed the offence by driving to that point, in circumstances which he knew were such that he might have a hypoglycaemic attack at any moment.[71] Commenting on Marison’s case, Child and Reed have expressed the view that denying the defendant theuse of the defence because he was at fault for creating the conditions that led to it, is like presenting the law in reverse.[72] However, Baker has observed that, most legal jurisdiction will be wary in excluding any defence of intoxication or automatism resulting from the defendant’s own fault or negligence,[73] since such a person though blameless might still represent a danger to the community.[74]
Another question that the application of the doctrine of prior fault raises is whether the basic and specific intent crimes distinction applies in cases of self-induced automatism. The law seems more complicated on basic intent. The general rule is that the defendant cannot use the defence of automatism if the automatic state resulted as a result of his recklessness. For example, if the self-induced automatic state is caused by taking alcohol or other intoxicating substance. In R v Bailey[75] Griffiths J stated, ‘In our judgment, self-induced automatism, other than that due to intoxication from alcohol or drugs, may provide a defence to crimes of basic intent…’ In R v Majewski, [76] it was established that a self –induced intoxication negates a defence of automatism in basic intent cases. Individuals who consume alcohol or other intoxicants may be able to foresee the risk of causing harm to others. However it seems the defendant will be able to successfully rely on automatism if he did not know his actions are likely to lead to a self-induced automatic state in which he may commit an offence, and he has not been reckless.[77]
As earlier noted, under the PCL there is neither an express or implied provision on automatism, as in the CCA 2004. Muslim jurists believe that there are three basic requirements for the application of legal punishment. They are that the offender must have had the power to commit or not to commit the act (qudra); he must have known (‘ilm) that the act was an offence; and he must have acted with intent (qaṣd).[78] It has also been stated that unconsciousness removes criminal responsibility, unless it was the result of drunkenness, since this is in itself an offence. This means that a defendant will generally not be held liable in automatism cases. It is however doubtful if the law will allow a defendant escape liability if the state of automatism was self-induced.
Conclusion
The prior fault doctrine is an established principle under most jurisdictions, including the Nigeria criminal justice system. Although the doctrine violates the principles of contemporaneity, correspondence, mens rea, volition, fair labelling etc as earlier stated, it is generally justified under widely accepted principles such as the principle of responsibility, the tracing principle, causing the conditions of one’s defense principle, constructive liability principle, law of complicity, corporate liability etc. All these principles point to the fact that a defendant who voluntarily gets intoxicated or automatistic should not be allowed to escape liability. This is to avoid situations which would result in too many acquittals of guilty defendants and bringing the law into disrepute by offering no protection to potential victims.
[1] Cap C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
[2] Cap P 89 Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963.
[3] (1980) LPELR-2045 (SC).
[4] Bryan A Garner (ed), The Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, West Publishing Co 2004) 144.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Udosen Jacob Idem, ‘Criminal Responsibility and the Defence of Insanity, Insane Delusion and Irresistible Impulse in Nigeria’ (2018) (4) (2) Donnish Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 011-020.
[7]Henry Black (ed) (6th edn Springer, 1994) 13.
[8] (2001) LPELR-459(SC) p 9 – 10 paras. G – B.
[9] Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP, 2013) 86.
[10] (1963)A.C. 386 para 401; Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland (1963)A.C. 386 para 409.
[11] Black’s Law Dictionary (n 4) 1231, 641.
[12] Ashworth and Horder (n 9) 80; Gideon Yaffe, ‘Intoxication, Recklessness and Negligence’ Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2012 (9) 551.
[13]Ashworth and Horder (n 9) 80.
[14] Susan Dimock, ‘Actio Libera in Causa’ (2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy 550.
[15] Alan R. Ward , ‘ Making some Sense of Self-Induced Intoxication’ (1986) (45)(2) Cambridge Law Journal 254.
[16] Ibid 255.
[17] [1955] 3All ER 249.
[18] (2014) LPELR-22193(CA) 21-22 paras G – C; D.P.P. v. Majewski (1975) 3 W.L.R. 404.
[19] R v O’Grady (Patrick Gerald) [1987] QB 995; Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder (n 9) 198.Jerome Hall, ‘Intoxication and criminal Responsibility’ (19744) (57)(7) Harvard Law Review 1047…1045-1084; I Wharton, Criminal Law (12th edn Lawyer’s Co-operative Publishing Company,I932) 95; United States v. Drew, 25 Fed Gas. No. I4,993 (00D Mass. 1828).
[20] John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (1998, CUP) 50-51.
[21] Ibid 50.
[22] Douglas Husak, ‘Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?’ in R. A. Duff (ed), Philosophy and the criminal
law (CUP, 1998); Douglas Husak, ‘Rethinking the act requirement’ 2007 (28) Cardoza Law Review 2437–2459.
[23] Susan Dimock, ‘Intoxication and the Act, Control/Agency Requirement’ (2012)6 Criminal Law and Philosophy 344.
[24] Paul Robinson, ‘Causing the Conditions of One’s Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine’ (1985) 71(1) Virginia Law Review 1.
[25] Ashworth and Horder (n 9) 93.
[26] Dimock 2013 (n 14) 566.
[27] Ibid 565.
[28] Ibid 566-7.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ashworth and Horder (n 9) 76.
[31] HM Keating and others, Clarkson and Keating: Criminal Law (8th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 431.
[32] Simester A P, ‘intoxication is Never a Defence’ [2009] Crim LR 13.
[33] Dimock 2013 (n 14) 552.
[34] Kharisu Sufiyan Chukkol, The Law of Crimes in Nigeria (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd 1988).
[35] (1963) AC 349.
[36] Ibid.
[37] (1835) 2 Lew CC 144.
[38] [1975] 2 All ER 960; (1974) 60 Cr. App R. 308 CA (Crim Div); R v Moore (George Allen) [1975] 1WLR 739.
[39] [1987] 85 Cr App R 315, QB 995; O’Connor [1991] Crim LR 135.
[40] [1977] AC 443, 474 – 475.
[41] (1550)1 Plowden at I9, 75 Eng. Rep.
[42] (1962) 133 CCC 1; R v Tramble (1983) 33 R (3d) 264.
[43] [1988] Crim LR 547.
[44] (1985) 80 Cr. App R. 157.
[45]Keating and others (n 31) 432.
[46] CCA 2004, s 29.
[47] Okeke v State (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.842)25 p 21-22 paras G – E.
[48] (1996) LPELR-3236(SC); R v. Owarey 5 WACA 66 at 67.
[49] (1980) 3 – 4 SC 1.
[50] Ahmed v State (1999) LPELR-263.
[51] Imo v The State (1991) 11 SCNJ, 137 & 159.
[52] (1980) LPELR-2045(SC) 18.
[53] TRF Butler and S G Mitchell, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (38th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) pp 21-2 arts 42 and 43.
[54] [1970] 1 Q.B. 152.
[55] Imo v State (1991) LPELR-1499(SC) 17.
[56] Qur’an 5:90.
[57] Sulaiman Olayiwola Rabi’u, ‘Defence Mechanism in Criminal Liability under Islamic Law’ (2016) 4(4) International Journal of Innovative Legal & Political Studies 24.
[58] Rudolph Peters, Crimes and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteen to the Twenty –First Century (CUP 2006) 35.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] C O Okonkwo, Okonkwo and Nash on Criminal Law in Nigeria (3rd edn, Spectrum Law Publishing 2018) 155; Republic v Harmer [1964] LLR 36.91.
[62] Susan Dimock, ‘What are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible For? The Intoxication Defense Examined’ (2011) Criminal Law and Philosophy 6.
[63] Keating and others (n 31) 425.
[64] John Child and Allan Reed, ‘Automatism is never a Defence’ (2014) 65(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 171; Ronnie Mackay, ‘Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 146, 146–48.
[65] The Law Society Gazette, ‘Automatism for the People’ <www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/automatism-for-the people/36910.article> accessed 8 November 2020.
[66] [1973] QB 910.
[67] (1945) 173 LT 191.
[68] Ashworth and Horder (n 9) 94.
[69] (1956) 2 NY2d 13 3, 143.
[70] [1997] RTR 457.
[71] Ibid 461.
[72] Child and Reed (n 64) 174.
[73] B M Baker, ‘Mens Rea, Negligence and Criminal Law Reform’ (1987) 6 (1) Law and Philosophy 64.
[74] R. v. Kemp [1956] 3 All E.R. 249; Hill v. Baxter [1958] 1 All E.R. 193.
[75] [1983] 1 WLR 760, 765.
[76] [1977] AC 443.
[77] R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760, 765; R v Majewski [1977] AC 443.
[78] Rudolph Peters (n 58) 20.