MOHAMMED vs. OKAFOR & ORS.(2022)LCN/17124(CA)
PRINCIPLE:
โThis is an action that was commenced by Originating Summons seeking among other things declaration that the meeting of 6th Respondent held on 9th October, 2018 and the National Convention of 6th Respondent held on 10th June, 2019 were in brazen violation of a valid consent judgment of the Federal High Court delivered on 20th day of March, 2018 and in contravention of the Constitution of the 6th Respondent to this appeal.
Issue 3 relates to whether lower Court has vires to interpret the Consent Judgment aforesaid entered in FHC/ABJ/CS/866/2018 โ Labour Party & Ors. v. Comrade Salisu Mohammed & Ors. on 20th March, 2018. The said Consent Judgment can be found on pages 63 โ 67 of the Record of Appeal.
The settled position of the law is that judgment given in any cause or matter becomes immediately binding upon the parties to it and enforceable under the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. Such judgment remains binding and subsisting unless it is set aside by a higher Court. See CHIEF UJILE D. NGERE & ANOR. VS. CHIEF J. W. OKURUKET โXIVโ & ORS. (2014) 11 NWLR (PART 1417) 147 AT 173 C โ H per RHODES- VIVOUR, JSC, who said: โ287(3) of the Constitution reads:
โ287(3) The decisions of the Federal High Court the National Industrial Court, a High Court and of all other Courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the federation by all authorities and persons, and by other Courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, a High Court and those other Courts, respectively.
The judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction subsists until upset on appeal. While the judgment subsists every person affected by it or against whom the order is made must obey even if appears wrong judgment takes effect immediately they are delivered and every Court has inherent power to proceed to enforce Judgments at once. The enforcements on delivery can only be interrupted by a stay of execution provided there, is an appeal.
Parties are thus bound to obey Court orders that are clear and unambiguous, notwithstanding the fact that the order maybe wrong. So long as a party refuses to implement or obey a Court order he would not be given a hearing in any subsequent application. See Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 12 NWLR (PT.225) P. 539; Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 26) P. 39.โ (Underlined mine).
The lower Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the 1st Respondentโs action as constituted before it.
Originating Summons is not designed for the interpretation of judgment of a Court whether of coordinate jurisdiction or that of a higher Court. See RACE AUTO SUPPLY COMPANY LTD. & ORS. V. ALHAJI FAOSAT AKIB (2006) 13 NWLR (PART 997) 333 AT 351 E โ 352 A โ E per MOHAMMED, JSC, who said: โIn this appeal, it is necessary to examine the status of the Lagos High Court consent judgment of Obadina, J. (as he then was) of 4-5-98 which was placed before Shitta-Bey, J. of the same Lagos High Court for interpretation by the appellants under Order 46 Rule 1 of the Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, which provides:
โAny person claiming to be interested under a deed will, or other written instrument may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for declaration of the rights of the parties interested.โ
The question is whether the consent judgment of 4-5-98 between the parties which was before the trial Court for interpretation on the application of the appellants comes within the definition of โwritten instrumentโ capable of being accommodated under the rule. The word โinstrumentโ is defined in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, as โanything reduced to writing, a document of formal or solemn character. However, whether anything reduced to writing is an instrument largely depends on the context in which it is used. For example, the same Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 3 at page 1386 stated plainly that โorders of Court were not instrument within Apportionment Act, 1834โ. One may find support in this observation by Stroud to say that a judgment of a Court of law can hardly be accommodated under the words โother written instrumentโ under Rule 1 of Order 46 of the Lagos High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1994, under which the appellants filed their application for the interpretation of the consent judgment of 4-5-98. In other words, a judgment of a Court of law cannot be subjected to interpretation by a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction like a deed, a will or an instrument containing right and obligation of parties under Order 46 Rule 1 of the Lagos High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. In any case, even if the consent judgment in the present case were to be regarded as instrument under Rule 1 of Order 46, the provision would not give a High Court jurisdiction to determine any question of construction or interpretation arising from the judgment of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction like the Lagos High Court presided by Obadina, J. (as he then was) and the same Court as presided by Shitta-Bey, J. or that of a higher Court like the Court of Appeal or this Court. If a judgment of a Court of law were to be regarded as an instrument like a deed or will, then even the judgment of the Court of Appeal or this Court could be subjected to interpretation by the High Court under Order 46 Rule 1 which is rather absurd. In the present case therefore, the Court below was quite right in its decision that the trial Lagos High Court presided over by Shitta-Bey, J. lacked competence to subject the consent judgment of the same Court delivered by Obadina, J. (as he then was) to interpretation of the contents or terms thereof.โ
To my mind, the whole gamut of the questions postulated for answers in the suit and the reliefs sought therein were in effect an invitation to the lower Court to sit over the judgment of Court of coordinate jurisdiction and to sit as appellate Court on the judgment of his learned brother which he could not rightly do under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the law.
In the case of MR AKINFELA FRANK COLE VS. MR. ADIM JIBUNOH & ORS. (2016) 4 NWLR (PART 1503) 499 AT 521 C โ H, the apex Court in the land reaffirmed the position stoutly when GALADIMA, JSC, said: โA Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction has no constitutional power to sit as an appellate Court in another case and review and/or adjudicate on a decision or order made by another Court of the same hierarchy. See Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. A.G., Lagos State (No.1) (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.112) 707 at 724, Paras. C-D where the Court held: โThe presumption has always been that the decisions of a superior Court are within jurisdiction and are correct until the contrary is proved. It seems to me that even if the decision of the superior Court is a nullity, the only proper way of challenging such decision must be by an application before the very Court which tried the case or by an application to the appropriate appellate Court even if the judgment of Longe, J., were a nullity the proper way to set it aside is by an appeal not by review before a Court of co-ordinate jurisdictionโฆ it seems to me that, in view of the provision of the constitution, which carefully shares jurisdiction to the various Courts. Only the Court vested with the particular jurisdiction can interfere with the decision of another Court.
The ruling of the trial Court that it has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit is due to the averments of fraud contained In the statement of claim, whereas the substance or issue in the suit is a challenge and a disguise to set aside the decision and auction carried out by virtue of an order made by a Court of coordinate jurisdiction in the earlier Suit No. ID/1 082/90. This is not proper.โ
The 1st Respondent is estopped from instituting another action to enforce judgment already given in Suit FHC/ABJ/CS/1866/2014 by HON. O. KOLAWOLE (now Justice of Court of Appeal) on 20/3/2018 which has already stated the right of the parties.
The position taken by the 1st Respondent is an exercise in crass abuse of the process of Court which must be terminated. See
- TTMIPRE SYLVA V. INEC & ORS. (2015) 16 NWLR (PART 1486) 576 AT 623 โ 624 G โC per NGWUTA, JSC.
- HON. TITUS ADENIYI OYEYEMI RTD. & ORS. V. HON. TIMOTHY OWOEYE (2017) 12 NWLR (PART 1580) 364 AT 397 C โ H per BAGE, JSC, who said:
โThe logic of judicial sanctity dictates that the earlier suit and its appeal ought to be rested and decided one way or the other including whether or not the appeal was validly withdrawn. By instituting another action which embodies the issues as in the earlier action on appeal makes the later manifestly an unpardonable abuse of Court process.
This Court has succinctly enunciated in Ntuks v. NPA (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt.1051) 392 at 419-420, Paras. H-C on the meaning of abuse of Court process and held that: โAbuse of Court process generally means that a party in litigation takes a most irregular, unusual and precipitates action in the judicial process for the sake of action qua litigation, merely to waste valuable litigation time. It is an action which could be avoided by the party without doing any harm to the matter in dispute. The process of the Court is used malafide merely to overreach the adversary to the direct annoyance of the Court. The Court process is initiated with malice or in some premeditated or organized vendetta, aimed at frustrating either the quick disposal of the matter or the abatement of the matter for no good cause. The Court process could also be said to be abused where there is no iota of law supporting it. In other words, the Court process is premised or founded on frivolity or recklessness.โ
That precisely is what the 1st Respondent has done by the institution of this suit.
The lower Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit and whatever order made in it by the lower Court is a nullity and this Court is under obligation to set it aside. See ALHAJI JIBRIN BALA HASSAN VS. DR. MUAZU BABANGIDA ALIYU & ORS. (2010) 11 SCM 69 AT 93 E per ONNOGHEN, JSC, later (CJN, Rtd.) who said: โIt is trite that jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication and that where a Court lacks the competence to hear and determine a matter but proceeds to do so, an appellate Court is duty bound to nullify a decision resulting therefrom.โ
It is for the above reasons and the fuller reasons given in the leading judgment that I entirely agree that this appeal be and it is thereby allowed and the order made in the suit, Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1636/2021 on 16/6/2022 should be set aside.
I also agree that the said suit filed by the 1st Respondent be struck out.
I agree with the consequential order as to costs contained in the leading judgment.โ Per IGE, JCA.